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Abstract. Can machines ever have qualia? Can we build robots 
with inner worlds of subjective experience? Will qualia 
experienced by robots be comparable to subjective human 
experience? Is the young field of Machine Consciousness (MC) 
ready to answer these questions? In this paper, rather than trying 
to answer these questions directly, we argue that a formal 
definition, or at least a functional characterization, of artificial 
qualia is required in order to establish valid engineering 
principles for synthetic phenomenology (SP). Understanding 
what might be the differences, if any, between natural and 
artificial qualia is one of the first questions to be answered. 
Furthermore, if an interim and less ambitious definition of 
artificial qualia can be outlined, the corresponding model can be 
implemented and used to shed some light on the very nature of 
consciousness.1In this work we explore current trends in MC and 
SP from the perspective of artificial qualia, attempting to 
identify key features that could contribute to a practical 
characterization of this concept. We focus specifically on 
potential implementations of artificial qualia as a means to 
provide a new interdisciplinary tool for research on natural and 
artificial cognition.  2 
1   INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that human conscious perception is not directly 
based on data acquired by senses, but heavily biased by 
psychological aspects like, for instance, cognitive context, 
subject history, and expectations. Additionally, context and 
subjective history is in turn shaped by the specific way in which 
stimuli are consciously perceived. Although we tend to believe 
that we perceive the reality, the fact is that qualia generated in 
our brains are far from being a truthful representation of real 
world. Nevertheless, generally our conscious experience of the 
world proves to be highly reliable in terms of everyday tasks. In 
short, the world is interpreted by the subject in such a way that is 
advantageous for his or her goals.  
The former intuitive definition of conscious perception does 
not seem to be sufficient to build a comprehensive model of a 
conscious machine that includes phenomenal aspects (see for 
instance [1] for a discussion about the grand illusion of 
consciousness and perceptual phenomenology). We do not seem 
to have a satisfactory model or theory about what exactly qualia 
could be (either in conscious machines, humans or other 
animals). In other words, the phenomenal dimension of 
consciousness, both in natural and artificial creatures, remains 
elusive to scientific study. Additionally, as pointed out by 
Sloman [2], many times we might be discussing bogus concepts 
due to the use of misleading contexts and ill-defined terms. 
Although we are proposing here a set of new definitions, it is not 
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our aim to contribute to the existing confusion in the field of 
MC, but to help clarifying concepts from the engineering point 
of view. As argued by Sloman [2], directing the basic questions 
about consciousness to machines with different designs can help 
to figure out what really needs to be explained.  
While many Artificial Intelligence (AI) implementations 
cover some aspects of the broader picture of cognition, we have 
not yet reached the point where human-like conscious machines 
are possible [3]. One of the greatest challenges that still needs to 
be addressed is the design of computational models of qualia, i.e. 
models of artificial qualia. MC designers are in the need of a 
practical definition of what could be an artificial conscious mind.  
In this work, we assume that a complete and scientifically 
established definition of what artificial qualia could be does not 
yet exist. Therefore, we propose to circumvent this problem by 
looking for alternative, interim, and partial definitions that could 
contribute to the development of MC research field.  
This approach does not necessarily lead to better 
implementations in terms of performance, but the whole exercise 
might at least provide more insight about what conscious 
machines could be like, what design strategies appear to be more 
promising, and how neuroscience could benefit from the 
application of computational models of qualia. As Chrisley has 
suggested [4], one of the aims of SP should be to characterize the 
phenomenal states possessed or modelled in MC 
implementations. 
In the remainder of this paper we attempt to provide a 
decomposition of the artificial phenomenology problem into 
more tractable and recognizable steps. It is our hypothesis that 
the partial definitions of artificial qualia that we outline here may 
become useful conceptual tools in the domain of SP. Initially, in 
Section 2, we analyze the context of this research and introduce 
some of the constraints and difficulties that we have to deal with. 
Relevant related work is briefly discussed in Section 3. Section 4 
covers the specific characterization of artificial qualia that we 
put forward. Then, in Section 5, the proposed approach is 
considered from the point of view of practical scientific 
applications. We illustrate this topic by suggesting that qualia 
could be studied in machines with relatively simple experiments 
involving, for instance, the apparent motion effects in visual 
experience. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 6.   
2   TACKLING THE PROBLEM  
Taking into account the complexity of the problem described in 
the previous section, we have no other option but to bear with 
some of the well-known but controversial issues of the scientific 
study of consciousness. In relation with the specification of 
phenomenal states, it is convenient to distinguish between 
different components of such an intricate concept as 
consciousness. Additionally, the way in which phenomenology 
can be studied satisfactorily has to be analyzed. In particular, the 
problem of private first-person observations is discussed.  
2.1   Decomposing a complex concept 
Many problems in the science of consciousness are rooted in the 
fact that the term consciousness can be used to refer to multiple 
related aspects [5]. In other words, consciousness can be seen as 
different phenomena according to the perspective of the 
observer. If we distinguish between phenomenal and functional 
dimensions of consciousness as suggested by Block [6], the brief 
description of the perception process outlined in Section 1 can be 
seen from two different perspectives:  
 
a) Conscious perception is the set of phenomenal 
experiences of which our inner life is made of (the 
‘what is it like’ to have experiential mental states [7]), 
e.g. the redness of red.  
 
b) Conscious perception is the set of functional 
representations or internal models of the world 
adapted to our needs, which are made available for 
use in reasoning and action, e.g. the neuronal 
encoding of color in the brain (see [8] for details). 
 
These two views (phenomenal consciousness and access 
consciousness respectively) should not be considered exclusive 
or contradictory, but complementary aspects of the same 
complex process. In fact, natural cognition shares these 
properties: the conscious contents of our minds are both 
experiential mental states and also functional representations 
accessible for reasoning and action. As Haikonen has suggested 
[9], qualia are the direct products of the perception process, and 
without qualia there is no consciousness. Therefore, qualia 
cannot be neglected in the study of consciousness, especially if 
we want our MC computational models to be of any use to the 
quest for the understanding of human cognition. 
While qualia are usually associated with the first view 
(phenomenal consciousness), most of the work done in the 
domain of artificial cognitive systems is exclusively related to 
the second view (access consciousness). One of the reasons for 
this bias is the poor comprehension of phenomenal aspects of 
consciousness. Another significant reason is that plenty of work 
still needs to be done on machines that apparently do not require 
qualia for successful performance. A related problem is to 
determine why some machines might need qualia. These issues 
are briefly covered in the next subsections.  
2.2   Avoiding the first-person/third-person problem 
The problem of considering both personal and access views at 
the same time is that phenomenal consciousness is only available 
to the first-person observer, i.e. it is a private property [10]. Inner 
experience in human counterparts is usually inferred by third-
person observers based on the similarity to their own case: if I 
feel pain when I get hurt, I infer other humans will likely feel the 
same in the same situations (because they have a nervous system 
like mine). However, when it comes to detecting the presence of 
phenomenal states in machines we do not even have the 
similarity argument as a factor to take into account in the 
inference process.  
Being phenomenal qualia inherently private, how could we 
determine if a machine is experiencing any inner life? (See [11] 
for a comprehensive discussion about the problem of measuring 
machine consciousness) This issue is quite related to the so-
called hard problem of consciousness [12], which seems to 
remain an open problem. Essentially, we do not yet have any 
convincing explanation of phenomenal consciousness (at least, 
we do not have a theory that could be translated into a 
computational model).  
Does this mean that any attempt to create artificial qualia will 
be futile? Or should we, instead of giving up the challenge, try to 
explore machine qualia as a means to shed light on the nature of 
consciousness? Do we really need to understand the very nature 
of consciousness in order to reproduce it in machines? Is there a 
real lack of scientific tools to address the problem of 
consciousness? Can we develop a model of phenomenal 
consciousness exclusively based on third-person approaches? 
Perhaps these questions cannot be answered yet; however, we 
believe third-person approaches can be successfully applied to 
make progress in the field of artificial cognitive systems and 
their application in AI-inspired biology.  
Typically, applying third-person approached involved looking 
exclusively at behaviour, including forms of accurate report [13]. 
However, external observers are also able to inspect the 
architecture and inner machinery of the creature. The inner 
inspection and monitoring of biological living organisms, 
including humans, is much more problematic than the inspection 
of working implementation of artificial cognitive systems. 
Therefore, the analysis of correlations between observed 
behaviour and internal inspection of MC implementations has to 
be exploited as it could provide valuable information about the 
models being tested (without the existing limitations in 
analogous experiments with biological creatures).  
We argue that, following this line of research, a limited 
definition of artificial qualia can be made in such a way that only 
third-person approaches are used. This partial definition might 
not explain phenomenal qualia as it is present in humans, but it 
could be used to create computational models, and subsequent 
implementations, which then could be used to enhance our 
understanding of “natural consciousness”. 
2.3   The function of qualia 
Understanding what is the function of qualia and why they 
emerged as part of biological evolution is an essential part of the 
challenge of the scientific study of consciousness. As usual, the 
research interplay between natural and artificial sciences can be 
seen both ways: on one hand, a comprehensive understanding of 
qualia, as they manifest in biological creatures, might make 
possible the building of conscious machines; on the other hand, 
the path to a complete understanding of qualia in biology might 
lay through the research on new computational models focused 
on phenomenology. 
These ideas about qualia are not free of controversies. While 
some argue that qualia are mere epiphenomena (e.g. [14]), we 
believe phenomenal consciousness appeared as an evolutionary 
advantage. One way to prove it would be to compare the 
performance of phenomenally conscious machines versus 
unconscious machines, both confronted to complex tasks in 
unstructured environments. Given that such an experiment is not 
realizable nowadays, we will focus on both evidence from the 
biological world and current computational models.  
There are many features related with consciousness that we 
know are useful because they contribute to survival (for instance, 
Theory of Mind [15], to name an illustrative one). These 
cognitive capabilities have a function and that is the reason why 
they have been selected by evolution. But, what about 
phenomenal aspects of consciousness? Do they have a clear 
functional role?  
Qualia or subjective experience should not be seen as an 
additional component of the complex notion of consciousness, 
but a process that is present in relation with cognitive features. In 
the context of the proposed functional role, qualia are 
experienced by a creature when it is able to introspect some of 
its perceptual processes and use that introspection to generate a 
meta-representation which in turn is used to modulate the whole 
system. Qualia are indeed the output of the perception process 
[9], which in some cases are made explicit thanks to a 
transparent access to the perception process outcome (sensory 
system response to stimuli). In short, when we are aware of a red 
object in our field of view, we do not perceive the colour red, but 
the redness quale, which is the reaction of our perceptual system 
to the red colour stimulus. 
The role of qualia described above could be studied in 
artificial systems. The generation of artificial qualia along these 
lines could provide insight about consciousness applicable to 
biological creatures. As argued by Sloman and Chrisley [16], a 
machine could even develop private ontologies for referring to 
its own private perceptual contents and states. The use of this 
ontology for modulating system processes is the function of 
qualia. A system with qualia is a system with meta-management 
capabilities (combination of introspection and active control 
based on self-monitoring). Making a serious effort to design and 
build such systems will contribute to the confirmation or 
refutation of these hypotheses about the role of qualia in 
biological creatures. 
3   RELATED WORK  
Neglecting the hard problem of consciousness has been one of 
the most common approaches in the practical design of artificial 
consciousness models. We think this position should not be 
criticized; at least when the phenomenal dimension is ignored 
explicitly, because tackling initially some of the so-called easy 
problems (see [12]) seems to be a plausible engineering strategy 
to begin with. However, as we pursue more ambitious 
objectives, like the ones outlined in the previous section, the 
field of MC should tend to adopt more tools based on the 
concept of Synthetic Phenomenology [4]. This aspect could be 
essential for the progress of existing research lines in the 
direction of human-like machines.  
The analysis of the computational correlates of artificial 
qualia done by Chella and Gaglio is a remarkable example in 
which the authors have directly addressed the concept of 
artificial phenomenology [17]. In this work, based on the 
cognitive architecture developed by the same researchers [18], 
an active process integrating internal and external flows of 
information is designed to build a two-dimensional, viewer 
dependent, reconstruction of the subjective scene as perceived by 
the robot. It is argued that the matching process between this 
reconstruction and internal perceptual data represents the 
artificial qualia of the system.  
Haikonen’s cognitive architecture is another example of a 
computational model that takes into account the generation of 
artificial qualia [9, 19]. It is argued that a realization of the 
conscious machine proposed by Haikonen would be endowed 
with an inherent mechanism to produce qualia with grounded 
meanings. Additionally, the machine would be able to report 
these qualia via secondary symbols such as uttered words.  
Even though other MC implementations have not been 
initially designed to have phenomenal consciousness, their 
capacity for sustaining phenomenal states can be explored. This 
is for instance the case of LIDA [20], which is based on the 
Global Workspace Theory [21], and has been designed to be 
functionally (but not phenomenally) conscious. What 
mechanisms would need to be added to an implementation like 
LIDA in order to render her phenomenally conscious (i.e., in 
order to have her generating and reporting artificial qualia)? As 
pointed out by her creators [22], implementing a mechanism for 
the generation of a stable, coherent perceptual world, along the 
lines discussed by Merker [23, 24] (i.e., suppressing apparent 
motion produced by the movement of sensory receptors) might 
contribute to the design of phenomenally conscious machines.  
Another significant work towards the definition of human-
like information processing architectures is H-CogAff [25], 
where a meta-management layer based on reflective processes is 
added. This particular case of CogAff [26] is aimed at specifying 
a minimal architecture for a human-like system. In this work the 
issue of qualia is addressed as an architecture-based concept 
[16]. More specifically, virtual machine architectures are 
considered as a suitable domain for current MC analyses and 
experimentation. The virtual machine functionalism provides an 
account for phenomenology in which virtual machines, although 
not being physical, are real machines that can affect and be 
affected by the physical environment (see [16] for a thorough 
discussion on this point). Moving the discussion about qualia to 
the level of description of virtual machines – which is not 
definable in terms of physical sciences – might help clarifying 
what qualia actually are.  
In relation with the problem of testing for the presence of 
artificial qualia, Gamez has proposed a scale that attempts to 
estimate the probability of a machine being able to sustain 
phenomenal states [27]. This scale makes no assumptions as to 
what specific mechanisms could be used to generate qualia. It is, 
instead, based on the similarity to human brain in terms of 
complexity.  
More elaborated measures have been proposed to detect the 
presence of phenomenal states in neural systems. According to 
Tononi’s theory of information integration [28], phenomenal 
consciousness can be detected looking at the level of dynamical 
complexity of a system, i.e. the combination of integration (unity 
of conscious experience) and differentiation (ability to 
discriminate conscious experiences amongst a vast repertoire of 
possible scenes). According to this, an artificial system would be 
able to experience qualia only if it is able to sustain a high level 
of information integration.  
Apart to its theoretical application to biological organisms, 
Aleksander and Gamez have used Tononi’s information 
integration theory to analyze how different artificial neural 
network topologies generate different effective information 
levels [29]. This work is focused in the discriminative or 
informational value of qualia. Although information integration 
can be considered a fundamental aspect in relation with qualia, 
other properties, like the ones discussed above, have to be taken 
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4   CHARACTERIZING ARTIFICIAL QUALIA  
In the domain of MC research, designers have to deal with the 
concept of qualia in order to develop implementations that could 
be claimed to be conscious. One way to mitigate the complexity 
involved in this task is to conceptually decompose the notion of 
qualia into different aspects that can be analyzed separately. It is 
out hypothesis that working with these partial views might 
provide some insight to the whole picture. What follows is a 
specific proposal of partial but complementary definitions of 
artificial qualia.  
4.1   Partial definitions of artificial qualia 
We propose to distinguish between three different stages or 
characterizations of the development of mechanisms that support 
qualia in machines (see Fig. 1 for an illustration of the relation 
between these stages; see Section 5 for an explanation of the 
content represented in Fig. 1): 
 
- Stage 1. Perceptual Content Representation. At this 
stage the information acquired by the perceptual 
system of the machine is integrated and interpreted, 
generating a subjective representation. This content is 
built as a result of the combination of exteroceptive 
and proprioceptive sensing subsystems, hence giving 
place to an inherently subjective content 
representation. The process that generates this 
perceptual content involves a continuous checking for 
consistency. In other words, a number of possible 
partial reconstructions of the world compete for being 
integrated into the final consistent match. This match, 
or inner world final reconstruction, is achieved by a 
coherent integration between what is being perceived 
from the external world and what it currently 
represented as inner depiction (see Dennett’s Multiple 
Draft Model [30], for a more metaphorical description 
of these sorts of competitive/collaborative content 
creation process). 
 
- Stage 2. Introspective Perceptual Meta-
Representation. This stage refers to the monitoring of 
the processes mentioned in stage 1, and also the 
creation of derived meta-representations. Observing 
how machine’s own perceptual content is created can 
potentially result in a private ontology (meta-
representation) about what is it like for the machine to 
experience subjective perceptual contents. 
 
- Stage 3. Self-Modulation and Reportability. In the 
case of machine being able to achieve stages 1 and 2, 
meta-representations from stage 2, or introspective 
ontologies [2], could be used to modulate the way all 
perceptual systems work (including stages 1 and 2). 
This constitutes a self-regulation loop that has clear 
functional implications; i.e. qualia as defined here is 
part of a causal process. Additionally, introspective 
ontologies created in stage 2 could be used to report 























Figure 1. Stages in the development of artificial qualia 
 
Stages described above make no claims about the qualities or 
modalities of the specific contents of the artificial mind, or to 
what extent they could resemble human subjective experience. 
The presence of different sensory modalities (laser ranging, for 
instance) and different mechanisms for cognition will produce 
different conscious contents and associated qualities. 
Nevertheless, we argue that the abstract mechanisms described 
above resemble those that generate qualia in biological 
organisms. We suggest that this claim could be supported by the 
application of the proposed framework in computational models, 
thus enabling a comparative analysis between qualia generated 
by humans and qualia generated in machines. 
The proposed stages are just the components of a conceptual 
framework or guideline for the design of MC architectures. The 
subsequent implementations and experiments are expected to 
clarify some aspects of the nature of phenomenal experience and 
its impact in cognitive abilities.  
Self-consciousness is not specifically addressed in the 
proposed definition because it is not considered a requirement 
for phenomenal consciousness. Nevertheless, self-consciousness 
could be explained in the context of the proposed framework 
having a model of the body as part of the perceptual content 
representation. The concept of self would be expected to arise as 
a meta-representation in stage 2. Then, references to the self 
could be found in accurate reports generated in stage 3.  
4.2   Detecting the presence of qualia 
The definition of qualia that we have described represents a 
hypothesis to be tested. To be precise, it should not be taken as a 
valid and established knowledge. That would lead us to think 
that the presence of qualia can be scientifically tested just by 
detecting the proposed mechanisms through inspection. In 
contrast, what we suggest is to use this approximation to what 
qualia might be as a working hypothesis. Thus approach calls for 
the experimentation with MC implementations designed 
following these assumptions. 
The results of this testing process are expected to prove 
whether or not the original hypothesis was correct. One of the 
benefits of this kind of approach is that the firs-person problem 
mentioned above can be circumvented. Nevertheless, more work 
should be done in order to design meaningful experiments 
combining both behavioural outcome and architecture inspection 
(see for instance [31] for a particular discussion of misleading 
experiment design about self-consciousness using the mirror 
test). Also, identification of hallmarks of qualia, like bistable 
perception [32], should be put in the context of the present 
discussion. 
5   VISUAL EXPERIENCE AND APPARENT 
MOTION  
In order to illustrate the proposed segmented characterization of 
artificial qualia, the conscious perception of apparent motion is 
analyzed. Humans can perceive motion not only from real 
moving objects, but also from series of images containing 
spatially segregated visual stimuli [33]. Simple experiments to 
test this consist of two stationary blinking stimuli which are 
presented using different spatial and temporal parameters (see 






Figure 2. Sequence of images used to generate apparent motion 
qualia in humans 
 
The sequence of images depicted in Fig. 2 are used to generate 
apparent motion qualia in humans, and presumably also in 
phenomenally conscious machines. Note that a blank inter-
stimulus interval (ISI) is inserted after every dot stimulus (the 
looping sequence is as follows: left dot stimulus – blank – right 
dot stimulus – blank). 
This experiment, which is usually carried out with human 
subjects, could be carried out using a machine as subject. Putting 
this experiment in the context of the former characterization of 
qualia, let us consider a robot with a visual perceptual system 
modelled after the human visual cortex. The basic content at 
each stage could be described as:  
 
- Stage 1: “moving dot”. 
- Stage 2: “what is it like to see a moving dot”. 
- Stage 3: “I report to be watching a moving dot”. 
 
Fig. 1 represents these different levels of content in each of the 
stages that we have defined for the development of artificial 
qualia.  
The perception process in the robot would follow these steps: 
first of all, visual sensors, let’s say a stereo visual system 
composed of two digital cameras, acquires the images using their 
light detection sensors. At the same time, robot’s somatosensory 
system acquires the relative position of the cameras, their 
orientation, and their foveation. The combination of sensory data 
from exteroceptive sensors (pixel maps from cameras) and 
proprioceptive sensors (relative coordinates from camera 
position and focus sensors) is then used to form depictions of 
percepts along the lines described by Aleksander and Dunmall 
[34]. 
As the sequence described in Fig. 2 is presented to the robot, 
single depictive percepts are created to represent the appearance 
of dots and their relative positions. Subsequently, robot motion 
detectors (this detectors could be built for instance with artificial 
neural networks), fed with the stream of dot percepts, will 
eventually create new motion percepts depending, amongst other 
things, on the duration of ISI frames. These moving dot percepts 
(or moving dot representations) are the contents of Stage 1 
(“moving dot”). 
The presence of the motion percepts will in turn trigger a set 
of reactions in the system. For instance, if the robot is designed 
to keep track of some moving objects, or detect some types of 
trajectories, the associated detectors will be activated. Also, 
affective evaluations of percepts could be invoked (the robot 
could be designed, or could have learnt, that moving dots have to 
be evaluated positively, and therefore maintain bonds with 
them). If the robot were endowed with a mechanism to represent 
these reactions, he would generate meta-representations of “what 
is like” for the robot to see a moving dot. This content 
corresponds to our Stage 2 definition. 
Finally, if Stage 2 introspective content is used both for self-
regulating global perception-action processes, and also for 
reporting purposes, then the robot would be able to reason 
explicitly about what does it mean to him to see a moving dot. 
Provided with the necessary linguistic skills, the robot will also 
be able to report his mental content using his own ontology 
(Stage 3 content). 
6   CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A developmental view of qualia based on former work by other 
authors has been defined as an attempt to provide a conceptual 
framework for the creation of new MC models. The definition of 
qualia presented in this paper advocates for a functional role of 
phenomenal consciousness. Furthermore, self-modulation and 
integration of perceptual systems is appointed as a process being 
driven by the construction of introspective meta-representations. 
Additionally, reportability is assumed to be based on the same 
meta-representations.  
It is expected that implementations based on the proposed 
conceptual framework are able to incorporate the phenomenal 
dimension of consciousness into their models. That is not to say 
that they will become phenomenally conscious just because the 
proposed conceptual definition is considered. Nevertheless, we 
argue that exploring the design space in the proposed direction 
might shed some light to the problem of production of qualia, 
both in natural and artificial creatures.  
We are currently working in the development of visual 
illusion experiments, like the one described in the previous 
section, using the cognitive architecture CERA/CRANIUM [35]. 
We expect to draw some significant conclusions in the domain 
of synthetic phenomenology from these sorts of experiments.  
Phenomenology is typically one of the fields where 
advancement in natural sciences is more difficult and we think 
this discipline could benefit more from the research with 
artificial systems. It is especially in more challenging aspect of 
natural sciences where we think that using AI-inspired biology 
can sometimes provide some useful clues to boost research.  
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